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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Armando Garcia, plead guilty on Sept. 14th 2009, pursuant to 
a Rule 11 plea agreement, in case(s) H0B-00062 &CR-FE-08-17452, 
from --~~County, Idaho. 
Upon his conviction Garcia was sentenced to fifteen (15) years 
fixed, followed by an inditerminate sentence. 
Armando has filed since that time a Motion for a Rule 35, and 
a Motion to withdraw his guilty plea, then a post-conviction pet-
ition, finally this Appeal .. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns a involumtrary guilty plea, the issue 
being that the court abused its discretion, when it found that 
Armando's attorney was not ineffective, when he tricked Armando 
into signing the plea agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The fact is that the court used only part of the record when 
desiding Garcia's Petition for Post-Conviction, the parts used 
were only those parts that would uphold the dismissal of the Post-
Conviction. 
The court turned a blind eye to the facts contained in the 
record that proved that Garcia was tricked into signing the plea 
ii 
agreament, via coersion, out and out lies, and manipulation. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PET 
ITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF, CONCERING BREACH OF 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
iii 
1 • 
ARGUMENT 
WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION, WHEN IT FAILED TO 
RULE THAT ARMANDO GARCIA DID 
NOT RECIEVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTA-
NCE OF COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. 
a). In the Courts memorandum Decision and Order, (hereinafter 
M.D.O."), listed under (Ineffeotive assistance of counsel claims), 
the court states: 
APPEAL-1 
"In his first ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, petitioner alleges 
that his attorney "lied to me about 
the plea agreement, got me to plea 
under false pretenses and manipulation" 
Petitioner for post-conviction at 3. 
Petitioner has provided no information 
contained in an affidavit or otherwise, 
to explain or support this allegation. 
Neither the affidavit or facts in supp-
ort~of post conviction petition nor pet-
itioners second affidavit in support of 
petition for post-conviction relief con-
tain any statements referencing this 
claim. The state has provided an affidavit 
of John Defranco, who represented petit-
ioner at his change of plea hearing, Mr. 
Defranco states that he explained in great 
detail the ramifications of the plea agree-
ment in the above entitled case; specifically 
the fact that the state was free to argue 
for a fixed sentence of more then ten years." 
see Motion for Summary Dismissaland mem-
orandum in support of Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. Exhibit A at 1. As noted above 
the court set fourth the terms of the plea 
agreement on the record and inquired as to 
petitioners understanding of those terms, 
and suchwere also contained in writing 
signed by petitioner. During his change 
of plea hearing, the petitioner indicated 
that he could read and write and understand 
english language. see Respondent's exibit F 
at 6.After the court set fourth the details 
of the plea agreement, including 
the fact that there was no agreement 
as to sentencing, and ensured that 
petitioner understood the minimum 
and maximum penalties for the charges 
against him. The court inquired as 
follows: 
TheCourt: Mr. Garcia, I do have some questions for you. As I 
indicated, it is my understanding you wish to pled guilty pursuant 
to [a] writen Rule 11 plea agreement in these two cases to the charges 
of trafficing in heroin. Is that correct sir?" 
Here the court abuses its discretion, the court uses the record 
in making its deturmination here, but picks only the parts of the 
record that would support its decision. 
The court --ignores the totality of the circumstances, for instence, 
Mr. Garcia's attorney was completely ineffective, when he tricked 
Mr. Garcia into signing the Rule 11. 
The court knew that Mr. Garcia did not even know what a Rule 
11 was when he signed it: See Motion to withdraw guilty plea, 
(hereinafter "M.W.P"); see (M.W.P. p.12, li.12-15). 
A. "I wasn't aware that there was A,B, and C, catagory in those. 
He never once explained to me there was different catagories 
which would bind the courts to it." 
It cannot be said that Mr, Garcia made a knowing and intell-
igent choice to enter into a Rule 11 agreement, when he did 
not even know what a Rule 11 agreement was. 
APPEAL-2 
Since the attorney never explained the law in relation 
to the plea. The question is, did the attorney not know the 
law, or did the attorney withhold the facts of law from his 
client? 
Considering the fact that the attorney is a member of the 
state bar, we must conclude that he intentionally withheld the 
law in relation to the plea from Garcia. 
Therefore, the plea was entered invalidly, as it was involu-
ntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel: Scott 
V. Wainright, 698 F.2d 427 429-30 (11th Cir. 1983); 
"Trial Counsel's failure to 
learn and familiarize himself 
with the law in relation to 
the plea constitutes ineffective 
assistance and renders the 
guilty plea invalid." 
The court knew at the time, that it made its decision on Garcia's 
post-conviction petition, that Garcia, signed the Rule 11 without 
knowing what a Rule 11 was: (M.W.P. April 9, 2010 P.12, li.12-15) 
"I wasn't aware_ that there was 
A,B, and C, catagory in those. 
He never once explained to me 
that there was different catagories 
which would bind the courts to it". 
What Garcia ment by those was a Rule 11, who Garcia met by 
(he) was his then attorney "John DeFranco'! 
APPEAL-3 
Any document signed, whether it be a contract or an agreement 
or, decree. There must be a meeting of the minds, where both parties 
understand the contents and consequences of the document. 
Mr. Garcia did not know what he was signing, the attorney 
knew that Garcia did not know what he was signing, that makes what 
the attorney did a fraudulent act ... 
Never did DeFranco, tell the court that Garcia understood 
the Rule 11 plea agreement, the only thing DeFranco ever told the 
court, were things like (Ithink he understood):(M.W.P., P.47, li.23-
2 4, ) ; 
"subjectively, its possible that 
he thought that it was a 10-year 
fixed sentence." 
(M.W.P., P. 49, li.17-18); 
"I believe he understood. but I 
also believe that, through hook 
or crook, he was getting himself 
to 10 years 
(M.W.P., P. 50, li. 11 ); 
"I think he understood." 
Defranco even admits that he did not properly explain the 
Rule 11 to Garcia, what DeFranco "says" he said to Garcia, is not 
even understandible, in terms of what is in the Rule 11 that was 
signed, ( M. W. P. , P. 4 0, 1 i. 6-2 5) ; 
APPEAL-4 
Mr. DeFranco, first explained how and with what words, he 
explained the Rule 11 plea agreement to Mr. Garcia: (M.W.P. P. 
40, li. 6-25); 
Q. "I'm just wondering what words 
you used to explain the plea 
agreement?" 
A. The words I used to explain 
the agreement--I just remeber 
having conversations with 
Amando that Ms. Reilly could 
go in there and argue for 
fixed life if she wanted 
I know Armando was really 
in tune with the mandatory 
minimum sentence of 10 years 
And we discussed it in the 
context of Mr. Gordens offer 
Mr. Gorden had an offer for 
basically the same thing. 
It would have been an amend-
ment to a charge of 10 years 
And I believe that you would 
have limited yourself to 
a recomendation of 13 years 
fixed. So I used that as 
a basis to explain how the 
agreement would work. 
Basically, it would 
be my job to try to convince 
Judge Hansen that a 10 year 
sentence would be enough 
in terms of satisfying the 
four corners of sentencing 
and appealing to the court's 
reason for fashioning a sentence 
that took into account all 
the sentencing factors. At 
the same time it gave Armando 
a brake, so that was my goal 
going into it, and thats 
how I explained it. 
That explanation does not expalin anything, like did Amando 
Garcia, even understand the "deal" that this Mr. Gordens was trying 
to put togather? And anyway what could Mr. Garcia glean from what 
DeFranco's explanation above states? (That he is getting 10-13years? 
APPEAL-5 
Everything else in DeFranco's statement in far to vague to make 
any sence out of. And as we will show, the time frame DeFranco 
had to explain the plea agreement to Garcia in, did not allow 
for DeFranco to even explain this much to Garcia ... 
Also lets not forget the base question here, (did the court 
know at the time it desided the post-conviction, that Garcia did 
not understand the plea agreemnet when he signed it.) 
At one point, DeFranco states that "I know Armando was really 
in tune with the mandatory 10 year sentence. 
Further in to DeFranco's testimony, he states, that he went 
over the plea agreement with Garcia, but he dosn't recall going 
over the plea agreement with garcia, (M.W.P. P.,42,li.19-25). 
Well which is it? did he go over it with Garcia or did he 
not! He says on page 5 herein that he did, but now he says he 
dosn't remember doing it, fact is this whole statement condradicts 
itself. Its obvious, that the attorney is trying to fill in the 
holes in his story ... 
Then, when the court asked DeFranco, what Garcia thought 
he was getting [sentence wise] when Garcia signed the plea agreement, 
the attorney said: "A, subjectively, its possible that he thought 
it was a 10-year fixed sentence." (M.W.P., P. 47, li. 16-24.) 
Then if the court would read; (M.W.P., P.47, li.24-25 on 
over to P. 48, li. 1,) the court will see that DeFranco knew that 
APPEAL-6 
Garcia didn't understand the plea agreement. 
Then DeFranco admits, that he used Garcia's lack of under-
standing/ or Garcia's belief that he was getting 10years fixed 
to "BAIT" Garcia into signing the Rule 11 . ( M. W. P. , P. 48, Li. 1 0-
11_. ) 
This admission by counsel, renders the guilty plea invalid, 
a fact that has long stood in the court's; VonMoltke v. Gillies, 
332 U.S. 708, 68 s.ct. 316, L.Ed 309 (1974): 
"Prior to trial an accused 
is entitled to rely upon his 
counsel to make an indipen-
dent examination of the facts 
circumstances, pleadings, and 
laws involved and then offer 
his informed opinion as to 
what plea should be entered." 
Kennedy V. Maggio, 725 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1974); 
"Defence counsel's advice must 
be accurate based on current 
law in relation to the facts 
in order for defendant to make 
informed and conscious choice 
whether to plead guilty." 
U.S. V. Giardino, 797 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1997): 
"Trial counsel lied to defendant 
to induce a guilty plea, consti-
tutes ineffective assistance 
and requires the plea to be 
set aside." 
It is apart of the record that the attorney knew that Garcia 
did not fully understand the plea agreement, (M.W.P., P.47, li.21-
24 & P.48, li.21-22); "[A.] Absolutely, And you make your point 
APPEAL-7 
Subjectively, he thought that he was on his way." [refering to 
Garcia believing that he was getting 10-years fixed.] 
'i' Then on that same page, DeFranco was asked; Q. ) "So you do 
agree that at one point at least Armando was subjectively--
incorrectly--of the impression that he was looking at no more 
then 10 years?" (M.W.P., P. 48, li. 23-25.) 
A). 11 Ido. 11 (M.W.P., P.49, li. 1.) 
DeFranco testifies that on friday, sept.11 2009, he had 
brought a minimum of four offers from the state, to Garcia. 
( M.W.P., P. 39, li. 14-16,) then referancing what Garcia had 
said in: (M.W.P., P. 13, li. 5-7.) 
Concerning this Garcia testifies, that during the four 
times DeFranco came in with four different offers, DeFranco 
only spent a total of five minutes in the room, (M.W.P., P.13, 
li. 5-7.) This testimony of Mr. Garcia's, is uncontraverted, 
by DeFranco, and by the facts in record. 
Then DeFranco said that: "And I went in and did my level 
best to explain it to him; (M.W.P., P.46, li. 10-11.) 
Keeping in mind that DeFranco was rushing the process of 
getting Garcia into a plea agreement. DeFranco states. "we at 
the eleventh hour. truly resolved the case." 
APPEAL-8 
Just how much of a rush, becomes a question, because DeFranco 
says, that he explained the plea agreement to Garcia, on friday 
sept. 11, 2009, (M.W.P., P. 49, li. 7-14.) 
However, it is physically imposible to read the plea agreement 
in the time DeFranco spent with Garcia that day. 
We have established via the record, that DeFranco spent 
a total of five minutes with Garcia that day and, that five 
minutes was split up into four parts when DeFranco was coming 
in and out of the room. 
So spliting five minutes into four parts, we come up with 
1 minute and fifteen seconds each. Each time DeFranco went into 
the room with Garcia. 
So DeFranco said that he explained the Rule 11 (f)(1 )(c) 
to Garcia and let him read it, (M.W.P., P.40, li. 6-25.) 
It is not even remotely possible for DeFranco to explain 
what DeFranco says he explained to Garcia, ( !~ • :'; • :!:' • ' :!:' • ~ 0 ' l ; h 
~ let alone have Garcia read the document, as it took Garcia 
1 minute and fortyfive seconds to read it hear in prison. 
And yet, DeFranco testifies that, "I believe he understood. 
But !also believe that, through hook or crook, he was getting 
himself to ten years,"(M.W.P., P. 49, li.17-19.) 
APPEAL-9 
It is not pos£ible for DeFranco, to do all the explaining that 
he said he did, but then to make a determination such as the one 
above, ( I believe he understood. But I also believed that, 
through hook or crook he was getting himself to 10 years. there 
is just no way he did all this in a minute and fifteen seconds. 
The fact that DeFranco never knew for certain that Garcia 
understood the Rule 11 plea agreement. As he (DeFranco) testified 
"subjectively, its possible that he thought that it wasa 10 
year fixed sentence, (M.W.P., P.47, li. 23-25,) "Subjectively 
he though he was on his way," ¢'1.W.P., P.48, li.22,) 11 I believe 
he understood'''·-:_ ___ · ___ -_ "(M.W.P., P.49, li.17,) "I think he 
understood,"(M.W.P., P.50, li.11,) What DeFrancon.ever said was 
he knew his client understood, Which as an attorney is his duty! 
Hill V. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 88 L.Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366(1985); 
"A guilty plea defendant must 
establish that he would not 
have pleaded guilty, but would 
have insisted on going to trial, 
absent counsel's unprofessional 
errors or omissions. 
Garcia has shown that he would not have pleaded guilty to the 
charges, absent his attorney's omissions, by all the times he has 
chalanged the nature of his guilty plea in the court's since his 
conviction. 
Mr. DeFranco knew that Garcia thought he was getting a 10-
year sentence. Not just by what he said under oath, but what he 
APPEAL-10 
knew that his client believed and why his client believed it. 
"I remember him thanking me. And I remember, Like He Thanked Ms. 
Reilly at different times throughout the process and, subjectively 
its possible that he thought that it was a 10 year sentence." 
DeFranco at; (M.W.P., P.47, li.21-24.) 
DeFranco knew that Garcia thought he was going to get a 10 
year sentence, be cause DeFranco induced the plea through lies 
and manipulation. Which is a violation of Garcia's 6th amend. rights 
U.S. V. Giardino, 797 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.1986); 
"Trial counsel lied to defendant 
to induce a guilty plea, cons-
titues ineffective assistance 
and requires the plea to be 
set aside." 
U.S. V. Espinosa, 866 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1988); 
"Trial counsel's promise 
that defendant would 
recieve a spicific 
sentence which was 
used to induce guilty plea, 
constitutes inefective assis-
tance and requires an evident-
iary hearing to resolve 
the claim." 
The court abused its discretion when it ruled that Garcia's 
counsel was not ineffective, just on the record thus far. 
By that record it clear to see that the attorney never had 
the time to explain the true nature of the plea agreement to Garcia, 
but the lies he told Garcia~in order to get Garcia to sign the 
APPEAL-11 
Rule 11 agreement. 
DeFranco testified that he "BATED" Garcia into taking the plea 
agreement, (M.W.P., P.48, li. 10-12,) but how did he bate Garcia, 
thats the question. 
First; DeFranco, told Garcia, "I got a Rule 11 (f) (1) (c), then 
he pulled a law book out of his briefcase, opened it, and pointed, 
saying, look this is a rule 1 1 [pointingto the rule] then he pointed 
tosection ( f ) and said this is section ( f) , then he went down and 
pointed to section ( 1 ) , then he pointed at the section ( C) ' then he 
said, "this is why your rule 1 1 plea agreement says, "pursuant to 
I.C.R. 1 1 ( f) ( 1 ) (c).""Then he showed Garcia what it said in the 
book, it said; "(c) agree that a spicific sentence is the appropriate 
disposition of the case." 
Then he said,"Just go along with whatever the judge says and 
I gaurantee you will get the 10-years fixed ... " 
So how do we know from the record that DeFranco bated Garcia 
into signing the rule 11 plea agreement, One DeFranco never 
had the time to physically explain all that he says he did on 
(M.W.P., P.40, li.8-25,) that is an uncontraverted fact. But 
also, the document itself, [the rule 11] is ambigious: the 
rule 11 is "pursuant to Rule 11 ( f) ( 1) ( c), which states: "agree 
that a spicific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the 
case." 
APPEAL-12 
However, in the wording of the agreement, there is no mention 
of any spicific sentence. In fact, the sentencing aspect of 
the rule 11 (f) (1) (c), is open ended, anyone is free to argue 
for any type of sentence they feel like. 
There is nothing concerning sentencing, in the rule 11, 
that can be even remotely called spicific ... The rule calls 
for there to be "spicific" language or a spicific sentence. 
However the wording in the plea agreement is completely non-
spicific! 
There is controling law on this issue, out of the eighth 
and fifth circuits;(Margalli-Olera V. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 345(8th 
Cir. 1994): 
"Ambiguity in language in 
plea agreement construde in 
favor of defendant and against 
the government." 
U.S. V. Borders, 992 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.1993): 
"Trial counsel who induced 
defendant to plead guilty 
to a plea agreement which 
is ambigiuos, amounted to 
ineffective assistance of 
counsel." 
The court had all this information before it when it made 
its decision, (finding that DeFranco was not ineffective) that 
finding was an abuse of the courts discretion. 
The judge further abused his discretion when he ruled; 
APPEAL-13 
"Petitioner's claim is based upon an assertation 
that he understood the terms of the plea 
agreement to be different then what they 
were, that claim is unsupported by any evidence 
provided petitioner, and is contradicted 
by petitioner"s own statements at the change 
of plea hearing, as wellas by the writen 
plea agreement which was signed by petitioner." 
This is an abuse on the part of the court's because the court 
used part of the record, it used the part that was in disfavor 
to the petitioner's claims, see: (Memorandum, Decision & Order, 
hereinafter, M.D.&O.,) (M.D.&O., P.4, li.19-22, P.,5, li.3-9, 
P.,6, li.16-24, P.,7, li. 18-26,) 
Its an abuse of the court's discretion, because the court 
used part of the record against Garcia, but then ignored all the 
parts shown herein that proved Garcias claims ... 
The court chose to use the record in aid of making its finding, 
but only using part of the record and 'iqnoring the totality of 
the record is an abuse of discretion. 
The fact that the court states, that Gracia signed the plea 
agreement, and thats proof Garcias's claims are diproven, shows 
the courts abuse. 
APPEAL-14 
This is because: a). the court knows that the plea agreement 
itself is ambiguous by its very nature, see pages 12-13 herein 
which invalidates the plea signed or not, see: Margalli-Olvera 
v. I.N.S., and U.S. V. Borders, page 13 herein. and also U.S. 
V. Giardino, page 11 herein. 
b). Ohsept. 14 2009, Garcia entered his plea, the court uses 
(some) of the things that Garcia said, at that time, to show he 
understood the rule 11 (f)(1)(c). 
But the court" ignores, what he said during the same line 
of questioning, Garcia said: 
Q. [ by the court J "Do you 
disagree with any of the 
allegations that are con-
tained in either of these 
two cases, in either the 
amended information or 
indictment? in other words 
do you disagree with anything 
they say you did in either 
one of those two cases?" 
A. [Garcia]"I d,isagree with 
alot of it, your honor, but 
we have a plea agreement so 
i am just going to roll with 
that." 
It was at this point, the court abused its discretion, because 
it did not stop right there, and inquire, what it was e~actly, 
that Garcia did not agree with. And the court also knew that Garcia 
was going to agree with whatever it said from then on, because Garcia 
was rolling with it! 
APPEAL-15 
The court was obligated to find out just what it was that 
Garcia did not agree with, and that garcia understood theramif-
ications of his guilty plea, and not just rolling with it, for 
some unknown reason. 
c). The court further abused it judicial position, when it 
threatend Garcia, into maintaining his guilty plea! 
Q. [by the court] "Okay in 
this case, then sir, you do 
understand that I would, if 
you do disagree with the 
alligations, we could still 
go to trial in this case. 
Obviously, it would be under 
the origional indictment in 
the one case and the indictment 
in the other." 
It was fine for the court to inform Garcia that he could 
still go to trial if he wanted to. 
But to threaten Garcia, with the refiling of the origional 
indictment, goes beyond the scope of the couts duties and office. 
It is for the judge to try the case before it, it is for the pro-
secutor to deside what case to place before the court. 
The statement made by the court to Garcia was and is now 
precived as (Plead guilty or else!) 
The origional indictment was gone, it is the sole provence 
of the prosecutor, to deside to refile it or not, not the courts ... 
APPEAL-16 
The attorney had already told Garcia to plead guilty, and 
he would get 10-years, see page 12 herein. Then the judge threatens 
Garcia with the origional indictment, so whats Garcia going to 
do? He's going to do what he's told, thats what! 
Garcia even unknowingly, testified to that fact, when Ms. 
Rielly asked him: 
Q. [Ms. Rielly] "Oh, so you 
let Mr. DeFranco do all your 
talking? 
A. (Garcia] well, he's--yes 
thats what he's there for to 
advise me." 
And thats what Garcia did, he let DeFranco "advise" him and 
he [Garcia] (rolled with it.) Especially after the judge threatened 
him, which in itself invalidated the plea; U.S. V. Cruz, 977 F.2d 
732 (2nd Cir. 1992); 
"Trial judge's threat to impose 
maximum sentence if defendant 
went to trial without "good 
defence" required remand for 
resentencing in front of 
different judge." 
The court in its decision, states that "allegations contained 
in an application for post-conviction relief when they are disproved 
by the record, further, bare assertations, unsupported by spicific 
facts, do not make a prima facia case for ineffective assistance 
of counsel." for these reasons, the court concludes that summary 
dismissal is appropriate as to this claim."" 
This finding was an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
APPEAL-17 
court. Because of the court (again) only uses part of the record, 
(again) only that part of the record that supports the dismissal. 
If the court uses part of the record, then Equal Protection dictates 
that the court use all of the record. 
But the court does not use the entire record, it completely 
~gnores all the points described herein that prove Garcia's claims. 
Had the court used the entire record, it would have found what 
Garcia has shown this court herein; 
a). We have shown that Garcia did in fact recieve ineffective 
assistance of counsel; 
b). we have shown that Garcia didnot understand the true 
nature of the plea agreement; 
c). We have shown that the attorney DeFranco, knew that 
Garcia did not understand the plea agreement; 
d). We have shown that DeFranco, induced Garcia to plead 
guilty, with lies, coercion and manipulation; 
e). We have shown that the plea agreement was writen in an 
ambiguous manner, then used to Bait Garcia into signing it. 
f). We have shown that the judge threatened Garcia in order 
to maintain the plea agreement. 
g). And finally, we have shown that the court should have 
found these errors in the record, and ruled that Garcia 
did not recieve effective assistance of counsel •.. 
The court abused its discretion, by not examining the totality 
of the record/circumstances, which is a violation of Garcia's 
constitutional rights under the 5th., sixth, and fourteenth amend-
ments of both state and federal constitutions:Wade V. Calderon, 29 
F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994); 
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"Defence counsel's cumulative 
errors and omissions constitued 
ineffective assistance of counsel." 
U.S. V. Troy, 52 F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995); 
"The Ninth Circuit found the cum-
ulative effect of the errors de-
deprived the defendant of a fair 
trial. This case was not a ineff-
ective assistance of counsel claim, 
but rather trial court's action 
hindered the defendant's defence." 
Harris By And Through Ramseyer V. Wood 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); 
"Trial counsel's cumulative errors 
and omissions amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel in violation 
of the precepts of Strickland." 
Minus the afore stated errors, Garcia would not have plead 
guilty, and the two case's would have been dismissed prior to trial, 
this is because; 
[CLAIM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE] 
This court should examine the record of events 48 hours prior 
to the trip to Salt Lake City, that resulted in these charges; also 
the bank records of William Pierson, C.I. #1156, the court will 
find the following; William Pierson, used a phoney buisness account 
to deposit ill-gotten monies in, in order to save up for his trips 
to Salt Lake City to buy heroin, months prior to him making contact 
with Garcia; 
The court will find that William Pierson, was a failed-
confidential informant for both the State of Idaho and, the federal 
D.E.A., Failed because he committed a number of crimes while he 
worked as C.I. 1156, having been arrested for wepons and large 
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quantities of drugs. 
The court will see that Garcia only went with Pierson, in order 
to take care of an unrelated legal matter in Salt Lake City. 
Also, garcia did not buy the herion in the car, Garcia was not 
driving the car, and the car was rented by Pierson, Also, that 
Garcia's finger prints were not on any of the packs of heroin. That 
Pierson was in possision of the heroin, not Garcia. 
ALso that Garcia was under the influance of drugs and alcohol 
when he was questioned by the police,(without an attorney) ••. 
The court will finally see that the evidence does not support 
the crime charged. 
And that the attorney failed to investigate any of this, and 
the court knew these errors had occured, from the record, when it 
made its findings in the petition for post-conviction relief ... 
CONCLUSION 
Garcia ask one of two relief(s) to be granted by this court, 
1/. That he recieve the 10-year sentence that he was promissed; 
2/. That he be allowed to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. 
That this be accomplished in any way the court deems fit. 
On thisd-7 day otMA'{ 2014, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Armando Garcia, do hereby certify that I have caused to 
be mailed true and correct copie of the foregoing to those parties 
listed be low, by placing same into properly addresed envalopes 
with first class postage attached, then placing said envalope 
into the prisons legal mail system, on the date indicated below. 
MAILED TO: 
Done on this :2. 7 
Idaho Attorney Generals Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho. 83720 
day of M.41 2014 
BY: 
